A block cipher can be easily broken if its encryption functions can be seen as linear maps on a small vector space. Even more so, if its round functions can be seen as linear maps on a small vector space. We show that this cannot happen for the AES. More precisely, we prove that if the AES round transformations can be embedded into a linear cipher acting on a vector space, then this space is huge-dimensional and so this embedding is infeasible in practice. We present two elementary proofs.
Introduction
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [10] is nowadays the most widespread block cipher in commercial applications. It represents the state-of-the-art in block cipher design and the only known attack on its full version is the biclique attack [4] , which still requires an amount of cryptanalytic effort slightly less than the brute-force key-search. Practical attacks on reduced versions of the AES only tackle up to 6 rounds, with the Partial Sum attack being the most dangerous [8, 1] The best that a designer can hope for a block cipher is that all its encryption functions behave in an unpredictable way (close to random), in particular the designer aims at a cipher behaviour totally different from linear or affine maps. An indication of the cryptographic strength of the AES is that nobody has been able to show that its encryption functions are any closer to linear maps than arbitrary random functions. However, it might be possible to extend the AES to act on larger spaces, in such a way that the possible non-random behaviour of the AES becomes easier to spot. Generally speaking, the worst scenario for a designer consists of a space large enough to make the AES linear but small enough to allow practical computations.
In this note we prove in two elementary ways, respectively using counting arguments (Section 3) and number theory arguments (Section 4), that the round functions of the AES cipher cannot be embedded into a linear group acting on a vector space W , unless the dimension of W is huge, making this embedding useless in practice. Both proofs show that the smallest degree of a (faithful) representation of the group generated by the round functions of the AES, that is Alt ((F2) 128 ) [12] , is at least 2 67 .
Since computing a 2 67 × 2 67 matrix is infeasible in practice, our result shows that this attack cannot be mounted in practice.
In 1976 Wagner [14] studied the (faithful) linear representations of Alt((F2) 128 ) and was already able to prove that their minimal degree is 2
128 . Therefore, we do not claim any new algebraic result in this note. The interest of our note lies in three facts. First, we provide elementary proofs of our degree estimate, lacking a deep algebraic background, while Wagner's proof follows an involved argument relying on representation theory. Second, we show the link between a purely group theory result and a possible practical application in cryptanalysis, providing thus more assurance in the cipher itself (since the attack cannot be practically mounted). Third, our two proofs are based on utterly different arguments, one counting the number of group elements and the other estimating the maximal element order, but do lead to the same numerical estimate, which we find unexpected and deserves noting.
This note is part of the PhD thesis of the second author [11] , which was never before published in a peer-reviewed journal.
Preliminaries
Let n ≥ 2 be an integer. Let F = F2 be the field with 2 elements. Let V = F n be the vector space over F of dimension n. We denote by Sym(V ) and Alt(V ), respectively, the symmetric and alternating group on V . We denote by GL(V ) the group of all linear permutations of V .
Let C be any block cipher such that the plaintext space M coincides with the ciphertext space. Let K be the key space. Any key k ∈ K induces a permutation τ k on M. Since M is usually V = F n for some n ∈ N, we can view τ k as an element of Sym(V ). We denote by Γ = Γ(C) the subgroup of Sym(V ) generated by all the τ k 's. Unfortunately, the knowledge of Γ(C) is out of reach for the most important block ciphers, such as the AES [10] and the DES [9] . However, researchers have been able to compute another related group. Suppose that C is the composition of l rounds (the division into rounds is provided in the document describing the cipher). Then any key k would induce l permutations, τ k,1 , . . . , τ k,l , whose composition is τ k . For any round h, we can consider Γ h (C) as the subgroup of Sym(V ) generated by the τ k,h 's (with k varying in K). We can thus define the group Γ∞ = Γ∞(C) as the subgroup of Sym(V ) generated by all the Γ h 's. Obviously, Γ ≤ Γ∞ . The group Γ∞ is traditionally called the group generated by the round functions with independent sub-keys. This group is known for some important ciphers, for the AES we have
Γ∞(AES) = Alt(F 128 ).
Remark 1. The fact that Γ∞ is the alternating group is not an exception holding only for the AES. Indeed, any block cipher built choosing accurately the cipher components (SBoxes and linear mixing layer) will have Γ∞ as either the alternating group or the symmetric group, even if the cipher is defined over a positive characteristic (see [5, 2]).
Given a finite group G, we say that G can be linearized if there is an injective morphism π : G → GL(W ), for some vector space W (this is called a "faithful representation" in representation theory). If G can be linearized, then, for any element g ∈ G, an attacker can compute a matrix Mg corresponding to the action of g over W (via π). If the dimension of W is sufficiently small, the matrix computation is straightforward, since it is enough to evaluate g on a basis of W . In cryptanalysis, this attack would be called a chosen-plaintext attack and can easily be translated into a known-plaintext attack by collecting enough random plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
In this note we show that it is impossible to view Γ∞(AES) as a subgroup of GL(W ) with W of small dimension. In Cryptography it is customary to present estimates as powers of two, so our problem becomes to find the smallest m such that Γ∞(AES) can be linearized in GL(F 2 m ).
There are two elementary ways to show that a finite group H cannot be contained (as isomorphic image) in a finite group G. The first is to show that |H| > |G|, the second is to show that there is η ∈ H such that its order is strictly larger than the maximum element order in G. In Section 3 we present our result using the first approach and we show that m ≥ 67. In Section 4 we present our result using the second approach and we show again that m ≥ 67.
Counting the group size
In this section we show that the order of Alt(F 128 ) is strictly larger than the order of
First we recall some well-known formulae:
We begin with showing a lemma.
Lemma 1. The following inequality holds
20 .
Proof. Let n = 2 7 , we have to show 2
We first show that 2 n 19 < 2 n ! . Note that the following inequality
holds for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2 and 1 ≤ h ≤ 2 n−i . Clearly
We apply (1) with i = 1 and h = 1 and so we must prove
In a similar way for i = 1 and h = 2, from (2) we obtain
and so on for all 3 ≤ h ≤ 2 n−1 we obtain that we must verify
Then we proceed by applying (1) for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 2 and all 1 ≤ h ≤ 2 n−i , so that we need only to prove
In other words, we have to prove
But a direct check shows that the right-hand size of (3) holds when n = 2 7 .
We are left with proving the following inequality: 2 n ! < 2 n 20 .
We proceed by induction for 2 ≤ n ≤ 2 7 . In this range a computer computation shows that n 20 + 2 n n + 2 n < (n + 1) 20 .
When n = 2, we have 2 2 ! < 2
Suppose that 2 n ! < 2 n 20 and n ≤ 2 7 . We have to prove that 2
20 . Since
n and, applying (4), we get 2
Our result is contained in the following proposition. 
Remark 2. We could improve the previous bound to l ≥ 68 by using the finite version of the Stirling formula:
n log 2 (n) − n log 2 (e) ≤ log 2 (n!) ≤ n log 2 (n) − n log 2 (e) + log 2 (n),
However, our proof involves only elementary combinatorial arguments, which are not enough to prove (5) , since the latter requires some non-algebraic arguments, such as mathematical analysis.
Computing the maximum order of elements
In this section we compare the maximum order of elements in the two groups Alt(F 128 ) and GL(F 2 m ). We use permutations of even order. We denote by o(σ) the order of any permutation σ. We need the following two theorems.
Moreover, there is σ ∈ GL(F N ) whose order attains the upper bound.
Proof. It follows directly from Theorem 1 in [6] , with p = q = 2 and N ≥ 4 (so point (a) and (b) do not apply).
Theorem 2 (Theorem 5.1.A at p. 145 in [7] ). Let ν ≥ 3 and n = 2
contains an element η of order (strictly) greater than e √ (1/4)n ln n) .
In order to be able to compare the two estimates coming from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we rewrite Theorem 2 as follows, in order to have o(σ) even. Our proof is an easy adaption of the proof contained in [7] .
Proof. Let z be a prime number such that 4 + 3≤p≤z p ≤ n, where the sum runs over distinct prime numbers from 3 to z. Then Alt(F ν ) contains an element ηz whose non-trivial cycles are two transpositions and some cycles with length 3, . . . , z. Hence o(ηz) = 2 3≤p≤z p. If we show that there is a prime number z such that
we have done. Let θ(z) = ln(o(ηz)) = ln(2) + 3≤p≤z ln(p) and let us denote θ
. Since f (z) is an increasing function for real z > e, in the case when z is a real number and z ≥ 19 (for z = 19 note that 4+ 2<p≤19 p = 79 < 128 = 2 7 ≤ n), we have that
So, if z ≥ 19 and z ∈ R, we can write
We shall choosez ≥ 19 such that f (z)θ * (z) = n. Such az exists because f (19)θ * (19) < 100 < n and f (z)θ * (z) is an increasing function assuming all values. Since θ * (z) >z/2 forz ≥ 19, we have
However we also have f (n ln(n)) < n. Since f is an increasing function, this shows that n ln(n) < 4(θ 
We observe that (6) 
Conclusion
In this note we provided two elementary proofs, lacking a deep algebraic background, that the round functions of the AES cipher cannot be embedded into a linear group acting on a vector space W , unless the dimension of W is at least 2 67 . Since computing a 2 67 × 2 67 matrix is infeasible in practice, our result shows that this attack cannot be mounted in practice. Moreover, since we do not use the specific structure of the AES in our proof of Proposition 2, we note that such result could be used also for any other block cipher C acting on 128−bit messages such that the group generated by its round functions is Alt(F 128 ), e.g. SERPENT [15], or Sym(F 128 ). Moreover we observe that for any block cipher C acting on 64−bit messages such that Γ∞(C) = Alt(F 64 ) (e.g. KASUMI [13] and a special extension of GOST [3] ) with a similar argument of Lemma 1 we obtain )| and so if Alt(F 64 ) < GL(F Finally we note that the infeasibility of this type of linearization of a block cipher provides an additional motivation to check the size of the group generated by the round functions of a block cipher. In particular, it is important to check the optimal case when this group is the alternating or the symmetric group.
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